Chimpanzees, Dolphins, and Elephants are not Persons

       A coherent definition of “person” that recognizes all human beings as people is of the highest importance for the preservation of human society because only such a definition can permanently enshrine the dignity and equality of all human beings in civil law. Today, there are some who argue for the personhood of certain animals because these animals have a high level of functional ability. By incorrectly identifying personhood with functional ability, these men and women knowingly or unknowingly deny the personhood of many low-functioning human beings, thereby placing human lives in grave danger of manipulation, torture, and disposal.

       In this way, the debate surrounding the alleged personhood of animals is directly related to the abortion debate; however, the two formats of debate differ in an important way. The abortion debate is a battle over how to define the terms “human being,” “human person,” and “human rights” because it is the definitions of these terms that determine whether abortion is an act of unjust killing or merely the use of a woman’s right to choose. Those who argue for the personhood of animals, however, do not dispute the definitions of “person” and “rationality” (also called “reason”). Rather, the proponents of animal personhood claim that certain high-functioning animals fit into the already-established definitions of these words, and they seek to prove this by demonstrating the ways in which these animals are similar to human beings. In order to oppose this faulty perspective, the following will illustrate that the definitions of “person” and “rationality” are misunderstood by the proponents of animal personhood, and that these definitions do not, in fact, include any known animals other than human beings.

A Coherent Definition of Person

A person is an individual that is capable of self-knowledge, of self-mastery in matters of moral significance, and of freely giving himself or herself in relationship with other persons.¹ In other words, a person is someone rather than something, a “who” capable of expressing himself or herself as an “I.”² These capacities are founded on intellect and free will, which manifest themselves in the human person as discursive reason and a culpable moral conscience.³

Reasons Why Human Beings are the only Persons among the Known Animals

First, it must be said that a person is not merely a subject that performs certain actions; rather, a person is primarily a subject capable of certain actions. Unconscious individuals illustrate this point: people who are sleeping or under anesthesia remain persons because they have the capacity to express their personhood, although they are obstructed from doing so by their circumstances. The capacities pertaining to personality – namely, those mentioned in the definition above – set persons apart from non-persons and are especially worthy of civil protection because they enable civilization.

Rationality (also called reason) is not merely an additional trait or group of traits added to non-rational animals; rather, it is an essentially different way of being, thinking, and acting. In other words, with regard to being, thinking, and acting, rational and non-rational animals cannot be spoken of univocally.⁴ A rational being is capable of acting and reacting “intentionally;” that is, such a being is capable of knowing itself as an independent subject, of knowing what it is doing, of knowing why it is doing it, and of thinking and acting precisely because of its knowledge of these things.⁵ For instance, a chimpanzee can detect a rule, abide by a rule, and even create a rule. However, a chimpanzee cannot reflect upon a rule as such (upon a rule as a rule), which would require an essentially different relationship with the rule: having a definition of “rule,” knowing the rule to be a rule according to that definition, knowing the self in relation to the rule, having a defined morality by which to assess the rule, etc. In addition, a rational animal is capable not only of making judgments but of judging judgments; that is, it not only can perceive what is to be gained, but can also scrutinize the moral appropriateness of its desires.⁶ It is the difference between a two-dimensional and a three-dimensional relationship: for non-rational animals, judgments involve the animal and the object; for rational animals, judgments involve the animal, the object, and the truth.⁷ In other words, the capacity to act and react intentionally brings with it conscience and culpability worthy of scrutiny in a criminal court.

Rationality is made possible by intellect, which is the function by which abstract concepts are derived from the data of the senses.⁸ Whereas the senses detect changeable realities, the intellect can surpass detection to reflect upon unchanging realities as such – existence, truth, justice, infinity, eternity, etc.⁹ By its process of abstraction, intellect enables the rational being to think and act intentionally, thereby giving moral value to thoughts and actions. The result of the scrutinizing capacity of the intellect is free will. Together, intellect and free will allow for the capacities particular to personality mentioned in the definition above.

Note: the statement that human beings are rational does not imply that all or most human beings presently act or think rationally;¹⁰ rather, it means that all human beings will be rational if nothing obstructs them from becoming and remaining rational. Among physical beings, only humans are known to have discursive reason and culpable consciences, which are manifestations of intellect and free will; therefore, human beings are the only known persons among physical beings.

The knowledge, belief, warrant, and language of human beings are not merely a greater quantity of these same in non-rational animals. Rather, these four appear in an essentially different kind, grounded in a mind that can surpass instinct and habit to achieve introspection and, in matters of moral significance, self-mastery. While all species can be said to fall somewhere on a cognitive spectrum of lowest-functioning to highest-functioning, there is a threshold on the spectrum beyond which cognitive capabilities are essentially different than those that came before. This is the threshold of moral conscience, which is also the threshold of personhood.

The essential difference between the rational mind, capable of intentional actions and reactions, and the non-rational mind is the moral value it assigns to knowledge, belief, etc. Among chimpanzees, for instance, alliances, reciprocity, a sense of the well-being of the community, an awareness of the desires of others, a sense that certain factors affect community well-being, the impetus to reconcile divisions – these astonishingly complex structures and behaviors are not accompanied by the capacity to reflect upon these concepts in themselves (an alliance as an alliance, etc.).¹¹ Like chimpanzees’ democratic governance, these organic structures and behaviors have been naturally selected because they proved beneficial. In the absence of the capacity to reflect upon these things beyond the level of a three-year old child, they are not accompanied by any moral value.¹² For instance, reconciliation, while sensed as beneficial, is not recognized as something “just” or “good” according to definitions that chimpanzees are not capable of producing. Moreover, though certain non-rational animals can associate words with concepts, these animals have not been proven to understand language in the abstract way that provides for culpable free will and the traits particular to personality. This is why no non-human animal can be diagnosed with a personality disorder of the variety observed in humans. Among the known animals, it is only in the human being that knowledge can become understanding; that defense of another can become self-sacrifice; that affection can become love; etc.

With regard to the question of personhood, a fully-functional non-rational animal is not directly comparable to a healthy a three-year old human being, although the level at which they function cognitively may be similar. Primarily, this is the case because personhood is not a matter of functional ability. Secondarily, it does not logically follow that, because a being has the functional ability of a healthy three-year old human being, it is equivalent in dignity or even in potential utilitarian worth to a human being who, because of its latent and functional abilities, can intentionally do more for or against the world than a member of any other known animal species.

The reasoned position presented above is sufficient evidence that to say human beings are rational and that other animal species are non-rational is not merely an ideological judgment. The degree to which animals are presently respected and protected is deplorable and ought greatly to be increased; however, it does not logically follow that, if animals are not recognized as persons, they will not be given the respect and protection they deserve. The higher the cognitive capacity of a feeling, emoting, desiring species, the higher the degree of respect and protection that species ought to receive. However, civil laws are written by and for those whom they can govern, namely, persons, and the civil protections of personhood go far beyond the capacities of any known fully-functional non-human animal. Therefore, laws can respect and protect non-human animals but cannot pertain to them.

 

Adapted from Part II of Renna, James. Abortion, Personhood, and Marriage: a Pro-life Document in Three Parts. Amazon CreateSpace, 2015.

Citations

1 – Adapted from Catechism #357 – “He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons”

2 – Derived from Catechism #357 – “who is not just something, but someone”
3 – Intellect and free will are repeatedly regarded by the Catechism as the foundation of personhood – #341, #1834, etc.
4 – cf. Boyle’s “Univocality Assumption” – page 25
5 – Adapted from Boyle’s footnote #23 – page 22
6 – MacIntyre’s thought as passed on by RJS
7 – MacIntyre’s thought as interpreted by RJS
8 – “Abstraction” in the Catholic Encylopedia – “Abstraction is a process (or a faculty) by which the mind selects for consideration some one of the attributes of a thing to the exclusion of the rest.” Also see “Intellect” in the Catholic Encylopedia, Aquinas I, Q. 85, Art. 1, etc.
9 – cf. Aquinas – I, Q. 84, Art. 6, Reply 1
10 – cf. Boyle’s “Quanificationalist Assumption” – page 30
11 – Much of this Reply and parts of the content adapted from Q. 3, answer are the result of dialogue with JA, whose help was enlisted by DG
12 – Both in canon law (Can. 11) and in common law (citation below), seven years of age has been regarded, in practice, as the “age of reason”

All electronic texts were read on or before 11 April 2015

“Age of Reason” in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law: Second Edition. The Gale Group, 2008. Electronic version on legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. Second and Revised Edition. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online edition Copyright 2008 by Kevin Knight. www.NewAdvent.org/summa

Boyle, Matthew. “Essentially rational animals” in Rethinking Epistemology. Ed. Guenther Abel and James Conant. Berlin: Walter de Grutyer. Electronic version on dash.harvard.edu

Catechism of the Catholic Church. Missouri: Liguori Publications. English translation of the Latin text, 1994. Electronic version on www.Vatican.va

Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition. Washington, DC: Canon Law Society of America, 1983.

Duffy, Francis. “Abstraction” in Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907. Electronic version on www.NewAdvent.org

MacIntyre, Alisdair. Dependent Rational Animals. Carus Publishing Company, 1999.

Maher, Michael. “Intellect” in Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 8. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. Electronic version on www.NewAdvent.org