Chimpanzees,
Dolphins, and Elephants are not Persons
A coherent definition of “person” that
recognizes all human beings as people is of the highest importance for the
preservation of human society because only such a definition can permanently enshrine
the dignity and equality of all human beings in civil law. Today, there are
some who argue for the personhood of certain animals because these animals have
a high level of functional ability. By incorrectly identifying personhood with
functional ability, these men and women knowingly or unknowingly deny the
personhood of many low-functioning human beings, thereby placing human lives in
grave danger of manipulation, torture, and disposal.
In this way, the debate surrounding the
alleged personhood of animals is directly related to the abortion debate;
however, the two formats of debate differ in an important way. The abortion
debate is a battle over how to define the terms “human being,” “human person,”
and “human rights” because it is the definitions of these terms that determine
whether abortion is an act of unjust killing or merely the use of a woman’s
right to choose. Those who argue for the personhood of animals, however, do not
dispute the definitions of “person” and “rationality” (also called “reason”). Rather,
the proponents of animal personhood claim that certain high-functioning animals
fit into the already-established definitions of these words, and they seek to
prove this by demonstrating the ways in which these animals are similar to
human beings. In order to oppose this faulty perspective, the following will
illustrate that the definitions of “person” and “rationality” are misunderstood
by the proponents of animal personhood, and that these definitions do not, in
fact, include any known animals other than human beings.
A Coherent Definition of Person
A person is
an individual that is capable of self-knowledge, of self-mastery in matters of
moral significance, and of freely giving himself or herself in relationship
with other persons.1 In
other words, a person is someone rather than something, a “who” capable of
expressing himself or herself as an “I.”2
These capacities are founded on intellect and free will, which manifest
themselves in the human person as discursive reason and a culpable moral
conscience.3
Reasons Why Human Beings are the only
Persons among the Known Animals
First, it
must be said that a person is not merely a subject that performs certain
actions; rather, a person is primarily a subject capable of certain actions. Unconscious
individuals illustrate this point: people who are sleeping or under anesthesia
remain persons because they have the capacity to express their personhood,
although they are obstructed from doing so by their circumstances. The
capacities pertaining to personality – namely, those mentioned in the
definition above – set persons apart from non-persons and are especially worthy
of civil protection because they enable civilization.
Rationality
(also called reason) is not merely an additional trait or group of traits added
to non-rational animals; rather, it is an essentially different way of being,
thinking, and acting. In other words, with regard to being, thinking, and
acting, rational and non-rational animals cannot be spoken of univocally.4 A rational being is
capable of acting and reacting “intentionally;” that is, such a being is
capable of knowing itself as an independent subject, of knowing what it is
doing, of knowing why it is doing it, and of thinking and acting precisely
because of its knowledge of these things.5
For instance, a chimpanzee can detect
a rule, abide by a rule, and even create a rule. However, a chimpanzee cannot
reflect upon a rule as such (upon a
rule as a rule), which would require an essentially different relationship with
the rule: having a definition of “rule,” knowing the rule to be a rule
according to that definition, knowing the self in relation to the rule, having
a defined morality by which to assess the rule, etc. In addition, a
rational animal is capable not only of making judgments but of judging
judgments; that is, it not only can perceive what is to be gained, but can also
scrutinize the moral appropriateness of its desires.6 It is the difference between a two-dimensional and a
three-dimensional relationship: for non-rational animals, judgments involve the
animal and the object; for rational animals, judgments involve the animal, the
object, and the truth.7
In other words, the capacity to act and react intentionally brings with it
conscience and culpability worthy of scrutiny in a criminal court.
Rationality
is made possible by intellect, which is the function by which abstract concepts
are derived from the data of the senses.8
Whereas the senses detect changeable realities, the intellect can surpass
detection to reflect upon unchanging realities as such – existence, truth, justice, infinity,
eternity, etc.9 By
its process of abstraction, intellect enables the rational being to think and
act intentionally, thereby giving moral value to thoughts and actions. The result
of the scrutinizing capacity of the intellect is free will. Together, intellect
and free will allow for the capacities particular to personality mentioned in
the definition above.
Note: the
statement that human beings are rational does not imply that all or most human
beings presently act or think rationally;10
rather, it means that all human beings will be rational if nothing obstructs
them from becoming and remaining rational. Among physical beings, only humans
are known to have discursive reason and culpable consciences, which are
manifestations of intellect and free will; therefore, human beings are the only
known persons among physical beings.
The
knowledge, belief, warrant, and language of human beings are not merely a greater
quantity of these same in non-rational animals. Rather, these four appear in an
essentially different kind, grounded in a mind that can surpass instinct and
habit to achieve introspection and, in matters of moral significance,
self-mastery. While all species can be said to fall somewhere on a cognitive
spectrum of lowest-functioning to highest-functioning, there is a threshold on
the spectrum beyond which cognitive capabilities are essentially different than
those that came before. This is the threshold of moral conscience, which is
also the threshold of personhood.
The
essential difference between the rational mind, capable of intentional actions and
reactions, and the non-rational mind is the moral value it assigns to
knowledge, belief, etc. Among chimpanzees, for instance, alliances, reciprocity, a sense of the
well-being of the community, an awareness of the desires of others, a sense
that certain factors affect community well-being, the impetus to reconcile
divisions – these astonishingly complex structures and behaviors are not
accompanied by the capacity to reflect upon these concepts in themselves (an
alliance as an alliance, etc.).11
Like chimpanzees’ democratic governance, these organic structures and behaviors
have been naturally selected because they proved beneficial. In the absence of
the capacity to reflect upon these things beyond the level of a three-year old
child, they are not accompanied by any moral value.12 For instance, reconciliation, while sensed as
beneficial, is not recognized as something “just” or “good” according to
definitions that chimpanzees are not capable of producing. Moreover,
though certain non-rational animals can associate words with concepts, these
animals have not been proven to understand language in the abstract way that
provides for culpable free will and the traits particular to personality. This
is why no non-human animal can be diagnosed with a personality disorder of the
variety observed in humans. Among the known animals, it is only in the human
being that knowledge can become understanding; that defense of another can
become self-sacrifice; that affection can become love; etc.
With regard
to the question of personhood, a fully-functional non-rational animal is not
directly comparable to a healthy a three-year old human being, although the
level at which they function cognitively may be similar. Primarily, this is the
case because personhood is not a matter of functional ability. Secondarily, it
does not logically follow that, because a being has the functional ability of a
healthy three-year old human being, it is equivalent in dignity or even in
potential utilitarian worth to a human being who, because of its latent and
functional abilities, can intentionally do more for or against the world than a
member of any other known animal species.
The reasoned
position presented above is sufficient evidence that to say human beings are
rational and that other animal species are non-rational is not merely an
ideological judgment. The degree to which animals are presently respected and
protected is deplorable and ought greatly to be increased; however, it does not
logically follow that, if animals are not recognized as persons, they will not
be given the respect and protection they deserve. The higher the cognitive
capacity of a feeling, emoting, desiring species, the higher the degree of
respect and protection that species ought to receive. However, civil laws are
written by and for those whom they can govern, namely, persons, and the civil
protections of personhood go far beyond the capacities of any known fully-functional
non-human animal. Therefore, laws can respect and protect non-human animals but
cannot pertain to them.
Adapted from Part II of Renna, James. Abortion, Personhood, and Marriage: a
Pro-life Document in Three Parts. Amazon CreateSpace, 2015.
Citations
1 – Adapted from Catechism
#357 – “He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and of freely
giving himself and entering into communion with other persons”
2 – Derived from Catechism
#357 – “who is not just something, but someone”3 – Intellect and free will are repeatedly regarded by the Catechism as the foundation of personhood – #341, #1834, etc.
4 – cf. Boyle’s “Univocality Assumption” – page 25
5 – Adapted from Boyle’s footnote #23 – page 22
6 – MacIntyre’s thought as passed on by RJS
7 – MacIntyre’s thought as interpreted by RJS
8 – “Abstraction” in the Catholic Encylopedia – “Abstraction is a process (or a faculty) by which the mind selects for consideration some one of the attributes of a thing to the exclusion of the rest.” Also see “Intellect” in the Catholic Encylopedia, Aquinas I, Q. 85, Art. 1, etc.
9 – cf. Aquinas – I, Q. 84, Art. 6, Reply 1
10 – cf. Boyle’s “Quanificationalist Assumption” – page 30
11 – Much of this Reply and parts of the content adapted from Q. 3, answer are the result of dialogue with JA, whose help was enlisted by DG
12 – Both in canon law (Can. 11) and in common law (citation below), seven years of age has been regarded, in practice, as the “age of reason”
All electronic texts were
read on or before 11 April 2015
“Age of Reason” in West’s
Encyclopedia of American Law: Second Edition. The Gale Group, 2008.
Electronic version on legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. Second and Revised Edition. Literally translated
by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online edition Copyright 2008 by
Kevin Knight. www.NewAdvent.org/summa
Boyle, Matthew. “Essentially rational animals” in Rethinking Epistemology. Ed. Guenther
Abel and James Conant. Berlin: Walter de Grutyer. Electronic version on
dash.harvard.edu
Catechism of
the Catholic Church. Missouri:
Liguori Publications. English translation of the Latin text, 1994. Electronic
version on www.Vatican.va
Code of Canon
Law: Latin-English Edition.
Washington, DC: Canon Law Society of America, 1983.
Duffy, Francis. “Abstraction” in Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. New York: Robert Appleton Company,
1907. Electronic version on www.NewAdvent.org
MacIntyre, Alisdair. Dependent Rational Animals. Carus Publishing Company, 1999.
Maher, Michael. “Intellect” in Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 8. New York: Robert Appleton Company,
1910. Electronic version on www.NewAdvent.org



